

Data Storage in Gentelligent Components – A New Way for Self-Authentication

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Self-Authentication

Idea

Application Examples

Inherent Data on Gentelligent Components

Depth Reconstruction at Scratch Scale

Image Partitioning

Tracking the Reflexion Edge

Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components

Conclusion

What is Authentication?

- ▶ Verifying genuineness, origin vs. forgery
- ▶ Means
 - ▶ Historically: Stamps and seals on deeds
 - ▶ Handwriting: Signature
 - ▶ Forensics: *Fingerprint*



Impression of cylinder seal, Mesopotamia, Uruk Period (4100 BC–3000 BC)



Fingerprints, taken since 19th century

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- ▶ Verifying genuineness, origin vs. forgery
- ▶ Means
 - ▶ Historically: Stamps and seals on deeds
 - ▶ Handwriting: Signature
 - ▶ Forensics: *Fingerprint*
- ▶ Analog Authentication
 - ▶ Differences exist
 - ▶ Significance to original is detectable



Impression of cylinder seal, Mesopotamia, Uruk Period (4100 BC–3000 BC)




Fingerprints, taken since 19th century

Digital Authentication

- ▶ Digital data can be copied exact \Rightarrow Fingerprints could be transferred to forgeries
- ▶ Digital signature was introduced (symmetric keys, e.g. AES 256)


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
- ▶ Specific to data getting signed
- ▶ Specific to authenticating entity

Digital Authentication for Objects


- ▶ Digital signature is cryptographically proved to be very strong
- ⚡ Digital data is not related to real world
- ▶ Idea: Sign data describing specific component properties
 - ▶ None? Insert a random pattern!
 - ▶ Where to store data? Inherent!
- ▶ Every object/component may have a different pattern for verification

Self-Authentication

Analog Domain Digital Domain




Why is this self-authentication?



Prior Information

- ▶ Public key of signer needed
 - ▶ Public key can also be stored in digital data structure
 - ▶ Signed by root public key
- ⇒ Only prior knowledge needed: Public root certificate

Signature For Documents



Object to be authenticated

Analog label: Image features of document itself

No hand-written signature needed

Digital label where digital information about the fingerprint is stored

Individual Bank Notes




Object to be authenticated

Analog label where a fingerprint is situated

Digital label where digital information about the fingerprint is stored

Individual Bank Notes



- ▶ Individual watermarks possible
- ▶ (Money is as virtual as information)

Why Inherent?

- ▶ Fingerprint
 - ▶ Must be fixed to component
 - ▶ Not inherent
 - Can get lost
 - Can be mixed up
- ▶ Data
 - ▶ Centralized from database
 - Accessibility
 - Abuse to create forgeries
 - ▶ Not inherent
 - Can get lost
 - Can be mixed up

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
Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components

Conclusion

Gentelligent Components

Initial State of
Component

Construction Plans




Current State of
Component

Gentelligent Components


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
"Feeling"



Gentelligent Components


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
"Knowing"



Gentelligent Components


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Current State of Component

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

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

Using the knowledge

Genetics & Intelligence

⇒ Gentelligence




- ▶ Micro-structured surface for data storage
- ▶ Groove wound around component
- ▶ Cut in by Piezo tool during a turning process
- ▶ Depth is varied




- ▶ Micro-structured surface for data storage
- ▶ Groove wound around component
- ▶ Cut in by Piezo tool during a turning process
- ▶ Depth is varied
- ▶ **No digital structures can be created**

Transmission principle

- ▶ Groove is imprint of the analog signal run of the Piezo tool
- ▶ Recovering the run means reconstructing the analog signal
- ▶ Data transmission system
- ▶ Depth reconstruction with optical means
- ▶ Re-use existing methods
- ▶ Only qualitative (no exact scaling) reconstruction needed





Depth from Directed Illumination





- ▶ Parallel illumination
- ▶ Groove consists of shadow and reflexion region
- ▶ Variation of groove depth by d shifts
 - ▶ shadow border by w_s
 - ▶ reflexion border by w_r
- ▶ We focus on reflexion
 - ▶ Geometry does not allow shadows and reflexions
 - ▶ Less image perturbation
- ▶ Edge tracking solves depth reconstruction qualitatively

Surface under Directed Illumination











- ▶ Assumption: Groove runs approximately horizontal
- ▶ Perform several spectral analyses of the image $I(x, y)$ at column $x = x_i$ in vertical direction
- ▶ Filtering: Horizontal moving average (noise), vertical median (cutting artifacts)
- ▶ Vertical cut forms the 1D signal $f(y)$ which is analyzed


- ▶ Periodic reflexion area:
 $y = (n + \frac{1}{2})\lambda_0 + \phi_0$
- ▶ Distance λ_0 or frequency u_0
- ▶ Phase shift $\phi(u_0)$


Spectral Estimation

- ▶ $\rho(u) = 1/R \sum_r |F_r(u)|$
- ▶ No phase information as $\phi(u)$ is not shift-invariant
- ▶ Phase estimation extension of average periodogram method^a

^aDragon et. al., DAGM 2009









Extraction of the Groove Edge

- ▶ Model appearance of the groove edge
- ▶ Model movement of the Piezo tool
- ▶ Robust to perturbations



Extraction of the Groove Edge


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Adapted HMM Model

- ▶ Each node $S_{x,y}$ models one image pixel $I(x, y)$
- ▶ Observation probability: $p_o(x_i, y_i | I) \propto c - \frac{I(x_i, y_i+1) - I(x_i, y_i-1)}{2}$
- ▶ Transition probability: $p_t(x_{i+1}, y_{i+1} | y_i) \propto \mathcal{N}(\sigma^2, y_i)$
- ▶ Groove edge $Y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{s_x})$ is found with Viterbi algorithm

finding maximum of $P = p_o(x_{s_x}, y_{s_x}) \prod_{i=1}^{s_x-1} p_t(x_{i+1}, y_{i+1} | y_i) p_o(x_i, y_i)$



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
Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components

Conclusion

Fingerprint

- ▶ Imprint of grinding process
- ▶ Pseudo-random

- ▶ Sample intensity profiles using directed illumination
- ▶ Compare using NCC




NCC of Depth Profile


Component 1




Component 2 (?)



Cross Correlation of Depth Profile




Shifted Normalized Profile




Reading out

Proceeding

- ▶ Microscope with low magnification ($2.6 \text{ mm} \times 2 \text{ mm}$)
- ▶ Images are stitched together using ≈ 100 views
- ▶ Overall surface view is partitioned using ≈ 200 cuts
- ▶ Groove sections are extracted and connected




Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components



Run of the groove over one rotation

- ▶ Center of the groove wobbles (mechanical inaccuracies)
- ▶ Groove sections n and $n + 1$ are fused
- ▶ Exactly one groove wound around the component
- ▶ Groove center is subtracted \Rightarrow signal is available

Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components



- ▶ Inherent data storage and readout possible
 - ▶ Further error-correcting channel-code could be used
- ▶ Inherent fingerprint possible
 - ▶ Local disruptions can be overcome by using several grinding profiles

Self-Authentication

- Idea

- Application Examples

Inherent Data on Gentelligent Components


- Depth Reconstruction at Scratch Scale

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Self-Authentication in Gentelligent Components

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General idea

- ▶ Inherently store fingerprint in digital form
 - ▶ Sign digital data with a public key
- ⇒ No prior information needed besides a root public key

Self-authentication in gentelligent components

- ▶ Groove ($6 \mu\text{m} \pm 3 \mu\text{m}$) on surface
- ▶ Reading: Directed illumination
- ▶ Data density of $1.6 \text{ kbit}/\text{cm}^2$
- ▶ Fingerprint is grinding imprint
- ▶ Digital notation by sampled depth profiles

Data Density Calculation

Calculation


- ▶ 2-ASK: 1Bit/Symbol
- ▶ Data rate: $R = 1.1/\text{mm}$
- ▶ Groove distance:
 $d_f = 0.07 \text{ mm}$
- ▶ Density:
 $R \times \frac{1}{d_f} \approx 1.6 \text{ kbit/cm}^2$

Not taken into account


- ▶ Simplified demodulation
- ▶ Cross talking
- ▶ Redundancy for error correction
- ▶ Improved modulation scheme with multiple carriers

BER for Turbo Code

2/3 redundancy



Vertical cut



Power density spectrum

